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Abstract
This study addressed the controversy surrounding the locus 
of the inferential process (encoding vs. retrieval) in 
story comprehension by adopting a developmental 
perspective. Second, fifth, and eighth grade children, and 
college undergraduates, read eight stories from which two 
types of inferences could be drawn. Bridging inferences 
are inferences critical to the comprehension of a story 
while forward inferences are not. Eight questions (four 
inference and four filler) were answered to each story, and 
the dependent variables of reaction time and error rate 
were measured. The hypothesis that bridging inferences 
would be drawn at encoding was clearly supported as was the 
corollary that forward inferences would not be drawn until 
retrieval. Additionally, the hypothesis that second grade 
children would successfully draw the bridging inferences 
was supported, contradicting much previous research.
Errors reached asymptotic level at the fifth grade while 
reaction time decreased until the eighth grade, after which 
there were no significant differences. Bridging inference 
questions were answered faster and more accurately than 
forward inference questions, at all grade levels.
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1Inferences at Encoding vs. Retrieval: Clarifying
the Issues Based on a Developmental Perspective
A recent area of inquiry in the reading literature 
concerns children's ability to draw inferences from either 
single stimulus sentences or short prose passages. Some of 
the empirical issues that have stimulated the research are 
questions of: (a) age of onset of inferring ability in
children; (b) children's ability to draw different types 
of inferences; and (c) the distinction between inferring 
ability (can do) and inferring occurrence (does do). 
Children's Inference-drawinq Abilities
In one of the earliest studies on the ability of 
children to make inferences from prose, Paris and Carter 
(1973) tested children's ability to demonstrate 
constructive memory abilities (can they make inferences?) 
Their subjects consisted of second and fifth grade 
children. Simple three sentence stories consisting of two 
premises and one filler were presented to the children.
For example:
The bird is inside the cage. (Premise)
The cage is under the table. (Premise)
The bird is yellow. (Filler)
A recognition test was then given to each child ("Was this 
sentence heard before?"), and it consisted of both a true
2and false premise and a true and false inference. iMost 
errors committed by the children were on the true inference 
questions. This is not surprising, for if children's 
memory does have a constructive component, the implied 
information could very easily be expected to become a part 
of the memory representation for that information. 
Additionally, it was found that the older subjects made 
significantly fewer errors than the younger subjects.
While the previous finding would seem to indicate that 
children can at least make, inferences, as seen by their 
false recognition of them, this actually tells us very 
little about the inference-drawing process itself. These 
earlier findings were expanded upon by Paris and Lindauer
(1976), who looked at children's ability to use either 
explicit or implicit cues to recall a previously rehearsed 
sentence. The explicit cues were actually included in the 
original sentence while the implicit cues had only been 
implied by the content of the sentence (an instrument 
inference task). The argument made by Paris and Lindauer 
was that if children ordinarily supply missing but implied 
information into their memory representation for a 
sentence, then they should be able to utilize the implied 
instrument of the action as a retrieval cue for the 
sentence. For example, if the sentence presented was "Our 
neighbor unlocked the door" and the inference of "key" is
3made by the child in order to understand the sentence, then 
presentation of the word "key” ought to facilitate recall. 
In the explicit condition the words "with a key" would be 
added to the end of the sentence to make "key" an explicit 
recall cue. The results showed that their fifth grade 
subjects were able to make equally good use of the explicit 
and implicit recall cues while their first and third grade 
subjects recalled more sentences when given the explicit 
recall cue. However, the children who could not 
effectively use the implicit recall cues could generate the 
appropriate instrument implied by the sentence when asked 
to do so. Furthermore, Paris and Lindauer manipulated the 
situation so that the children could be made to make the 
appropriate inference by simply acting out the described 
actions in the experimental sentences. In this condition, 
there was no significant difference in recall between the 
explicit and implicit recall cues. The conclusion drawn by 
Paris and Lindauer was that the younger children did not 
spontaneously encode the inferred relation of the 
instrument but could be induced to do so. Paris and 
Lindauer speculated that their younger subjects did not 
spontaneously generate inferences simply because they did 
not approach their tasks with specific plans.
A similar study by Paris and Upton (1976), based upon 
the previous research of Paris and Lindauer (1976), drew
4essentially the same conclusions, although different 
inference-drawinq tasks were used. Paris and Upton found 
that between six and ten years of age, the ability to 
comprehend and remember semantic inferences such as 
presuppositions and consequences steadily improved. 
Presuppositions were loosely defined as inferences about 
prior actions in a story that were highly probable while 
consequences were defined as inferences about outcomes in a 
story that were also highly probable. The major difference 
between this study and the previously discussed study by 
Paris and Lindauer is that Paris and Lindauer examined 
inferences about instruments while this study examined 
inferences about presuppositions and consequences. An 
important point further revealed in the Paris and Upton 
article was that the developmental changes noted were not 
the result of a change in memory capacity alone, although 
both improved with age. This latter result was arrived at 
using an analysis of covariance design.
Another related study (Paris, Lindauer, & Cox, 1977) 
extended the earlier findings to children's ability to 
infer the implied consequences of actions. As before, it 
was found that the seven and eight year old children (first 
and second graders) did not construct inferential 
relationships from sentences very often but that older 
children (sixth graders) and college students did. It was
5once again shown that the children could be induced to 
infer the implied consequences by having them make up a 
story that would go along with the experimenter’s sentence. 
As Paris et al. (1977) conclude, "It is clear that young 
children are capable of inferring consequences and 
relationships from sentences as functional goals of some 
actions. They simply fail to manifest similar constructive 
actions when they are instructed to remember the sentences" 
(p. 1732).
A further study by Kail, Chi, Ingram, and Danner
(1977) provides more evidence that children can make 
inferences. In their task, they had second and fifth 
graders read two types of sentences from which different 
inferences could be drawn; transitive inferences and 
contextual inferences. A transitive inference that Kail et 
al. used as an example was taken from Paris and Carter 
(1973) and was the one listed earlier in this paper about 
the bird in the cage. This type of logically ordered 
relationship with three elements has also been referred to 
as a three-term series problem (Paris & Lindauer, 1977; 
Trabasso, 1977). The appropriate inference in this 
transitive-inference condition would then be "The bird is 
under the table."
An example of a contextual inference:
Mary was playing a game (Premise)
6She was hit by a bat (Premise)
Mary cried out in pain (Filler)
The appropriate inference would be "Mary was playing 
baseball.”
Following each set of three sentences, the children read 
and answered two questions, one concerning given 
information and the other concerning inferred information. 
Both reaction time and accuracy of response were recorded. 
The distinction between this study and the earlier one of 
Paris and Carter (1973) is that Paris and Carter tested for 
false recognition errors (false recognition of sentences 
that differed in syntax but were consistent semantically) 
while Kail et al. tested for the semantic consistency of 
what had been presented rather than the verbatim match.
The important finding for our purposes was that the 
children's accuracy on both the premises and inferences was 
above chance, indicating that the children could make 
inferences. A surprising finding from this study, however, 
was that while the children were more accurate on true 
premises than on false premises, and on false inferences 
than on true inferences, this performance did not change 
with age. It would appear that this research contradicts 
most of the research of Paris and his associates. Recall 
that Paris and Lindauer (1976) concluded that their first 
and third grade subjects did not spontaneously encode the
7inferred relation of the instrument while their fifth grade 
subjects apparently did so. Likewise, both Paris and Upton
(1976) and Paris et al. (1977) showed that the ability to 
make inferences increased with age. Kail et al., however, 
apparently found no developmental change in 
inference-drawing ability among their second and fifth 
graders. Which one is correct?
In their paper, Kail et al. stated that Paris and 
Lindauer (1977) offered a plausible explanation for why 
developmental differences may not be seen in 
false-recognition studies. Kail et al. interpreted Paris 
and Lindauers' explanation to read as follows: On the one
hand, improvement in memory skills with age would lead to a 
decline in the false-recognition of novel inferences. On 
the other hand, the improvement in inference making with 
age would lead to an increase in the false-recognition of 
inferences. Kail et al. concluded that, "A combination of 
both developmental changes might well produce an overall 
pattern of no developmental change” (p. 687). Kail et 
al. argue, however, that such a pattern of compensatory 
developmental changes could not have operated in their 
study. They stated that both increased retention and 
increased inference-making with age would lead to increased 
accuracy. While Kail et al. were correct in stating that 
such a compensatory process could not have operated in
8their study, they were incorrect in stating that Paris and 
Lindauer (1977) were positing the existence of such an 
compensatory process. In their article, Paris and Lindauer
(1977) proposed an explanation about why the 
false-recognition paradigm as used by Paris and Carter 
(1973) is an inappropriate method to use in an analysis of 
developmental change. Response biases as well as memory 
capacity will change with age. Nowhere was it stated that 
these effects would offset each other in such a way as to 
produce no developmental change. Kail et al., however, 
stated that no developmental changes were observed in the 
Paris and Carter (1973) study, therefore lending support to 
Kail et al.'s findings. However, Kail et al.'s 
interpretation of Paris and Carter's results is 
questionable. While it was shown in the Paris and Carter 
study that second and fifth graders responded similarly in 
recognizing falsely implied information as what had 
actually been presented, it was explicitly stated that the 
error rates decreased with age (as pointed out earlier), 
therefore showing a developmental difference. In other 
words, the older subjects were less likely to falsely 
recognize a semantically congruent sentence. This is an 
example of developmental change where Kail et al. argued 
none was shown.
While the difficulties between Paris and Carter's
(1973) study and Kail et al.'s (1977) study have been 
resolved, a problem still exists with regards to Kail et 
al.'s findings of no developmental changes while Paris and 
his associates found developmental changes. Possibly, the 
differences could be due to something as simple as the 
different stimulus materials used by each study. For 
example, Paris and Lindauer (1976) and Paris et al. (1977) 
used explicit or implicit cues with single sentence 
stories; Paris and Upton (1976) studied the ability to 
detect the truth or falsity of 13-16 sentence paragraphs; 
and Kail et al. (1977) studied the ability to detect the 
truth or falsity of three sentence paragraphs. Likewise, 
the difference could stem from the different types of 
inferences the tasks were asking the children to make. A 
point should be made at this time about the Kail et 
al. (1977) study, however. While the tone of Kail et al.' 
study has been that the children in their study could make 
inferences and that -this ability did not show improvement 
with age, this interpretation needs to be tempered. 
Although performance was near perfect on false inferences, 
performance on true inferences was only around 70 percent 
(at least as evidenced by their crude graph). While this 
was significantly above chance, it is not perfect, 
indicating room for improvement with continued development 
It may be that the observed lack of developmental change
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was due to the lack of an older group of children.
Dreher (1981) looked at inferences of a different sort 
- instantiations. Instantiations are particular exemplars 
or examples that are supposedly generated during reading 
from the more general terms that were actually used in the 
passage. The instantiations are then stored in memory and 
used to represent the meaning of the general terms. For 
example, in the sentence "The fish chased the man in the 
water," the word "shark" may be what is represented in 
memory rather than "fish." While instantiations have been 
found to be more effective recall cues than the actual word 
itself for adults (Anderson, Pichert, Goetz, Schallert, 
Stevens, and Trollip, 1976), the question still remained as 
to whether children can and do instantiate. Dreher's 
results, however, convincingly showed that the children in 
her study (fifth, sixth, and eighth graders) did not 
instantiate. After reading one of three sentences 
(exemplar, target, and control), the children were either 
given a particular cue or the general cue that was given in 
the sentence itself. For instance:
The scout earned a merit badge (exemplar)
The boy earned a merit badge (target)
The boy saw the policeman's badge (control)
The particular cue in this case would be "scout" while the 
general cue would be "boy." Whereas the instantiation
11
hypothesis would predict equal performance for the 
particular cues in both the exemplar and target sentences, 
this was not found. The particular cues elicited better 
performance on exemplar than on target sentences. Dreher, 
however, did show that children can instantiate, and 
therefore, draw inferences. When Dreher asked her subjects 
to write down what particular instance of the subject noun 
occurred to them when reading both target and control 
sentences, only four percent were left unanswered.
Some summary remarks can be given, based upon the 
evidence presented thus far. Regardless of the 
methodology, regardless of the type of inference studied, 
and regardless of age - at least as young as 
kindergarteners - it would appear that children can make 
inferences. It does not appear, however, as if young 
children spontaneously and reliably draw their own 
inferences and encode them with their reading of a passage. 
Likewise, children's inference-drawing .ability is not 
perfect. This ability would appear to be a developmental 
phenomenon which increases through at least the sixth 
grade. The only study cited which might question this 
latter point would be the Kail et al. (1977) study, and 
these differences have already been discussed. It is hoped 
that with the introduction of still another controversy in 
the reading literature, a unique methodology will present
12
itself which might help resolve the ambiguity surrounding 
the children's reading literature. It is to this second 
controversy that we now turn.
Encoding vs. Retrieval Debate
Questions still remain as to where the inferential 
process occurs. Is an inference truly encoded as text is 
comprehended and, therefore, stored as a part of the memory 
representation for that text, or do subjects simply draw 
the inference at retrieval, when they encounter it for the 
first time? Miller (1980), has argued that the 
determination of the locus of inferential elaboration is 
necessary because the alternative explanations have 
different implications for cognitive theories of memory, 
language comprehension, and reading. This is so because 
the effective stimulus (text base) will be significantly 
influenced by the elaboration process. If inferential 
information is contained in the text base constructed by a 
reader, then processes operating at comprehension must 
account for their generation. Alternatively, if the text 
base does not contain the inferential elaborations of 
interest, then the presence of such inferences can only be 
explained by processes occurring at retrieval.
Miller (1980), in a recent comprehensive review of the 
inference literature, attempted to resolve much of the 
ambiguity surrounding the encoding versus retrieval debate.
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He identified three experimental paradigms within which 
much of the inferential research is conducted: cued
recall, recognition, and reaction time.
Cued Recall Literature
Taking the cued recall studies first, Miller (1980) 
stated that their validity rests upon the encoding 
specificity principle first developed by Tulving (Tulving & 
Thompson, 1973). The encoding specificity principle makes 
the assumption that retrieval cues which are part of the 
information originally encoded during an episode will act 
as the most successful cues. Therefore, if individuals 
make inferences during the process of comprehension (the 
inference-at-encoding view), then the inferred information 
should act as a successful retrieval cue because it is part 
of the memory representation resulting from that particular 
episode. The earlier mentioned study by Paris and Lindauer 
(1976) is a prime example of a cued recall study. Evidence 
supporting the inference-at-encoding viewpoint utilizing, 
the cued recall paradigm is provided by Miller (1980) and 
Paris and Lindauer (1976). However, the issue is far from 
resolved.
Corbett and Dosher (1978) provide evidence that 
questions the conclusion drawn above. They utilized a 
methodology similar to that of Paris and Lindauer, but 
argued against Paris and Lindauer’s interpretation that the
14
implicit recall cues were effective due to the appropriate 
inference being encoded. Essentially, Corbett and Dosher 
showed that a highly probable instrument was an effective 
recall cue even when a low probability instrument had been 
encoded. Furthermore, this finding was not due to the 
similarity of the high and low probability instruments, as 
evidenced by the finding that the subjects recalled the 
high probability instrument significantly more often in the 
high probability than in their other two conditions. They 
concluded that retrieval cue effectiveness cannot be relied 
upon as an indicator that implicit instruments are inferred 
and encoded in reading.
Further cued recall data contradicting the 
inference-at-encoding explanation are provided by the 
instantiation literature (Gumenik, 1979; Sanford, Garrod,
& Bell, 1978; Whitney & Kellas, 1984). Gumenik argued 
that if only predicates of the sentences were used 
("attacked the swimmer" rather than "The fish attacked the 
swimmer"), there would be no opportunity to instantiate the 
sentence subjects. Therefore, if the inference-at-encoding 
view is taken, "shark" should not function as an effective 
retrieval cue. In addition, a less accessible cue 
("barracuda," for example) would not be expected to be an 
effective cue. An inference-at-retrieval view would 
predict, however, that both "shark" and "barracuda" would
15
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still be better recall cues than "fish" because they share 
more features with the phrase "attacked the swimmer” than 
does "fish." "Shark" would produce better performance than 
"barracuda," though, because it shares more features in 
common with the to-be-remembered material. Gumenik's 
results convincingly supported the inference-at-retrieval 
viewpoint. Since there were no nouns presented in the 
phrase condition, there was no opportunity for them to be 
instantiated. And yet, they functioned as efficient 
retrieval cues. In another experiment, Gumenik even showed 
that a word which could not possibly be an instantiation 
but which shared meaning with the sentence as a whole 
functioned as a more effective retrieval cue than did the 
general nouns themselves.
The research of Whitney and Kellas (1984) provides 
further corroborating evidence against the instantiation 
hypothesis and the inference-at-encoding view. In a series 
of three experiments, they found no evidence for the 
inference-at-encoding view. Indeed, using a modified 
Stroop design, they found that even with sentences that 
were biased toward an atypical exemplar, the presentation 
of the typical exemplar produced significant semantic 
interference. Furthermore, these differences were not due 
to different encoding strategies. Whitney and Kellas were 
led to conclude, as was Gumenik (1979), that recall studies
16
do not provide convincing evidence for the 
inference-at-encoding position.
Finally, Sanford et al. (1978), uti1izing a self-paced 
reading paradigm, found that a final sentence of a three or 
five sentence passage that mentioned an instantiated object 
actually took longer to read than did a sentence that 
mentioned the more general term that had been used earlier. 
This was true even for passages which were heavily biased 
toward the drawing of the typical exemplar.
False Recognition Literature
Returning to Miller's (1980) review of the inference 
literature, he next summarized the studies using the 
recognition paradigm for studying inferences. Assuming the 
inference-at-encoding point of view, if subjects encode 
- inferential elaborations during comprehension, then it 
would be expected that they would falsely recognize test 
sentences which explicitly state those inferences. Three 
studies have reported just such a finding (Johnson, 
Bransford, and Solomon, 1973; Paris and Carter, 1973; 
Thorndyke, 1976), providing evidence for an 
inference-at-encoding view. Miller (1980) argued, however, 
that firm conclusions could not yet be drawn regarding the 
recognition literature for two reasons. The first deals 
with the fact that isolated sentence recognition tests 
often result in the use of inappropriate strategies by the
17
subjects (i.e., they tend to judge the truth of the test 
sentence rather than determining if it is a verbatim match 
to one held in memory; Anderson & Bower, 1973). The 
second criticism has to do with the subjects' own 
perception of their performance. If the subjects 
attributed the incompleteness of their memory 
representations to forgetting rather than to the implicit 
nature of the study sentences, the explicit test sentences 
may have been recognized as true because they were 
logically consistent with what was remembered.
In order to control for the extraneous variables 
listed above, Miller (1980) utilized a forced-choice 
recognition test. All of the subjects were presented with 
implicit study sentences. At test, the subjects were then 
presented with both the actual implicit study sentence and 
an explicit version of the same sentence. Miller argued 
that if subjects make the inference at encoding, then their 
false recognition of explicit sentences should occur at a 
chance level (.50) if not higher because it would be the 
closest match to their memory representation. A chance 
level of false recognitions might occur rather than a 
higher level simply because a particular inference might 
not be made by the subjects or some surface information 
about the study sentence in short-term memory may be 
retained. If subjects make the inference at retrieval,
18
however, we would expect them to select the correct 
(implicit) sentence significantly more often than chance 
because it would be the closest match of the memory 
representation. The results showed that the subjects did 
not differ from chance in their ability to discriminate the 
actual implicit study sentence from its explicit 
distractor. These findings. would then seem to be in 
agreement with the inference-at-encoding position and lend 
further credibility to the two aforementioned studies.
A final pair of studies also utilizing the recognition 
paradigm provides further evidence for the 
inference-at-encoding viewpoint. McKoon and Ratcliff 
(1980, 1981) investigated recognition using a priming 
technique. Their method consists of giving subjects a 
series of four preparatory sentences followed by one of two 
final sentences which would either act to prime the target 
word or not. For example:
Bobby got a saw, hammer, screwdriver, and square from 
his toolbox.
He had already selected an oak tree as the site for 
the birdhouse.
He had drawn a detailed blueprint and measured 
carefully.
He marked the boards and cut them out.
Final sentence, version 1: Then Bobby pounded the
19
boards together with nails.
Final sentence, version 2: Then Bobby stuck the
boards together with glue.
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1981, p. 674).
In this case, version 1 primed the target word "hammer" and 
version 2 did not. The subjects' task was to respond ''yes” 
or "no" according to whether or not the target word 
appeared in the paragraph. The results showed that the 
appropriate action did prime the target word and resulted 
in shorter response latencies. In a related study, it was 
also found that a less related target word (such as 
"mallet" for the above example) did not result in shorter 
response latencies. In still another pair of experiments 
in the same study, it was found that the appropriate 
inference ("hammer") was drawn at encoding while the less 
appropriate inference ("mallet") was not. It would appear 
that the recognition literature provides universal 
agreement that inferences are drawn at encoding.
Reaction Time Literature
Finally, Miller (1980) reviewed the reaction time 
literature with regard to the inference at encoding versus 
retrieval debate. The underlying assumption of these 
studies is that, if inferences occur at encoding, then we 
would expect no differences in subject response latencies 
to a true-false verification test in which the tested
20
information was either explicitly stated or only implied.
In other words, subjects should be able to verify as true 
the implicit information just as quickly as the explicitly 
stated information.
Experiments by Keenan and Kintsch (1974) and Singer 
(1979) reported findings in which the implicit versions had 
longer response latencies than did the explicit versions. 
For example, in the Singer study, subjects took longer to 
respond that they comprehended the sentence "The shovel was 
heavy" if first given the sentence "The boy cleared the 
snow from the stairs" than if given the sentence "The boy 
cleared the snow with a shovel." These results would tend 
to argue against the inference-at-encoding view and support 
the alternative inference-at-retrieval view.
In order to provide a clearer picture of the reaction 
time data, Miller (1980) constructed a study with three 
treatments; the typical explicit and implicit treatments 
and an additional implicit-prompted treatment which 
required the subject to covertly infer the implied 
instrument or consequence. The implicit-prompted treatment 
was actually a question whose answer forced the subject to 
make the appropriate inference. If subjects infer the 
implied instruments during retrieval, as suggested above, 
then their latencies for the implicit paragraphs should be 
longer than those for the explicit and prompted paragraphs
21
because in the implicit treatment, the inferences would 
have to be made at the time of testing. If, on the other 
hand, subjects infer the implied instruments at the time of 
reading (encoding), then their response latencies should 
not differ from the implicit and implicit-prompted 
paragraphs. Miller's (1980) findings were consistent with 
the inference-at-encoding viewpoint. There were no 
significant differences between the implicit and 
implicit-prompted paragraphs. In addition, an unexpected 
finding (but one consistent with the inference-at-encoding 
view) is that the implicit and explicit conditions did not 
di ffer.
Miller (1980) resolved his findings in relation to 
those reported by Keenan and Kintsch (1974) by citing his 
counterbalanced block design and use of a within-subjects 
design as his main advantage over the study by Keenan and 
Kintsch. It is true that Keenan and Kintsch1s first 
experiment did not utilize a within-subjects design. Each 
subject received only the explicit version or the implicit 
version of each paragraph. It should be pointed out, 
however, that Keenan and Kintsch ran a second experiment in 
the same study in which a within-subjects design was used. 
Surprisingly, the results from this second experiment 
confirm nicely Miller's results. The subjects responded 
equally quickly on both the implicit and explicit paragraph
22
forms. While Miller's arguments about counterbalancing and 
within-subjects designs may well discount Keenan and 
Kintsch's first set of findings, what of those of Singer
(1979)? As it turns out (whether by design or accident), 
Miller failed to mention the article by Singer. Curiously 
enough, Singer did counterbalance his test sentences and he 
did utilize a within-subjects design. Miller, however, 
simply concluded "Thus, the significant difference between 
implicit and explicit response latencies in these earlier 
experiments may have been due to extraneous variance"
(p. 294).
Clarification of the Issues
Taking into consideration all of the evidence thus 
far, can any definitive statements be made concerning the 
encoding versus retrieval debate? At the end of his 
article, Miller (1980) seems content with his conclusion 
that, at least as regards inferred instruments and 
consequences of action, inferences appear to be drawn at 
encoding. The issue is simply not that clear cut, however. 
Many of the articles arguing for an inference-at-encoding 
position were not even addressed in Miller's article 
(Gumenik, 1979; Sanford et al., 1978; Singer, 1979; 
Whitney & Kellas, 1984). Consider the evidence as 
presented here. With regards to recall, the instantiation 
literature supports an inference-at-retrieval position
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(Gumenik, 1979; Sanford et al., 1978; Whitney & Kellas, 
1984). The implicit instrument literature (still within 
the recall paradigm) is divided. Support for retrieval 
comes from Corbett and Dosher (1978) while support for 
encoding is provided by Paris and Lindauer (1976) and 
Miller (1980). Examination of the recognition literature 
provides unilateral support for the inference-at-encoding 
view. But once again, the reaction time literature is 
inconclusive. Miller's results, as well as those of Keenan 
and Kintsch's (1974) second experiment, argue for encoding 
while the results of.Keenan and Kintsch's first experiment, 
as well as Singer's (1979), argue for retrieval. If 
nothing else, it should by now be apparent that the 
inference literature is characterized by inconsistency. 
Perhaps, however, this should not be viewed as a fault, but 
rather as a consequence of the complexity of the issue at 
hand. Obviously, there is no such thing as one type of 
inference. Even within a single research paradigm, 
different types of inferences have been studied. For 
example, within the cued recall paradigm, what are termed 
"instantiations” and the implied instruments in a sentence 
are two entirely different things. In addition, as McKoon 
and Ratcliff (1981) pointed out, one reason that 
instrumental inference designs are so hard to interpret is 
that the drawing of the instrumental inference is not
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usually necessary for comprehension. But even more to the 
point, it is possible that inference-drawing differs as a 
function of the stimulus materials. For instance, some 
authors have postulated that the locus of inference-drawing 
might change, depending upon the text base; single 
sentences versus passages or paragraphs (Dosher & Corbett, 
1978; Singer & Ferreira, 1983; Paris & Lindauer, 197.7; 
Whitney & Kellas, 1984). Even when a paradigm apparently 
offers unilateral evidence, as with the recognition 
literature, there is not agreement on the interpretation. 
Singer and Ferreira (1983) point out:
In particular, it has been pointed out that neither 
the false recognition of an implicational test 
sentence, nor the effectiveness of an implicit recall 
prompt, nor the reader's ability to answer questions 
that require inferences from text, prove that the 
inferences in question were drawn when the text was 
originally examined" (p. 438).
Probably the most fruitful line of research would 
adopt a more global view of the inference-drawing process 
in an attempt to integrate some of the discrepant findings. 
If a more unified approach were stressed, the possibility 
is greater that originally discrepant findings could be 
resolved. But how does this argument help extend the 
present discussion? Recall the inconsistencies in the
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reaction time literature between the results of Miller and 
those of Singer (1979) and Keenan and Kintsch's (1974) 
first experiment. Miller argued that his results supported 
an inference-at-encoding viewpoint while Keenan and 
Kintsch's as well as Singer's supported an 
inference-at-retrieval view. While Keenan and Kintsch's 
results were dismissed on methodological grounds by Miller, 
Singer's results cannot be. Can an explanation be found?
Singer and Ferreira (1983), apparently not content 
with the contrasting results, undertook to correct the 
problem. They distinguished between two types of 
inferences: forward and backward inferences. Forward 
inferences, they argued, are ones which might almost 
certainly be true (highly probable), but do nothing to 
contribute to the coherence of the message. For example, 
upon reading "The egg fell to the floor," do we encode that 
the egg broke? Backward inferences (Just & Carpenter,
1978; Singer, 1979; Thorndyke, 1976), also referred to as 
bridging inferences (Clark, 1975; Garrod & Sanford, 1981) 
are' inferences that enhance the coherence of a message 
because, without them, a message would become disjoint.
They specify a connection between the current phrase and 
the earlier discourse and appear to function so that 
context can be established (Thorndyke, 1976). For example, 
the inference that "The pitcher threw the ball" establishes
26
a connection between "The pitcher threw to first base" and 
"The ball sailed into the field." Singer and Ferreira went 
on to argue that since backward inferences contribute to 
coherence, it is likely that they are drawn during reading, 
unlike forward inferences, which are probably not drawn 
until retrieval. In this sense, backward inferences are 
actually quite similar to Haviland and Clark's (1974) 
discussion of the Given-New Strategy. The first sentence 
provides both "Given" and "New" information. Upon 
encountering the second sentence, the subject attempts to 
locate antecedent information in memory (the first 
sentence) that matches the second sentence’s "Given" 
information. If antecedent information is found, the "New" 
information from the second sentence is added to the 
"Given" information already present, thus forming a revised 
memory trace. The presence of the second sentence for 
backward inferences actually contributes more "New" 
information than do the single sentence forward inferences. 
For this reason, if the "New" information is not resolved 
with the "Given" information, comprehension of the 
sentences will suffer.
Given what appears to be a difference in terminology, 
how does this play on words help resolve the separate 
findings of Miller (1980) and Keenan and Kintsch's (1974) 
second experiment versus Singer (1979)? First, recall the
27
previous example of one of Singer's test sentences: "The
boy cleared the snow from the stairs." The subiects1 task 
was then to respond as soon as they comprehended the 
following sentence: "The shovel was heavy." According to
Singer and Ferreira's (1983) terminology, this would be an 
example of a forward inference, which, they would argue, 
should not be drawn until retrieval (as was found).
Although the word "shovel" is a high probability instrument 
for the sentence "The boy cleared the snow from the 
stairs," it does not contribute to the coherence of the 
sentence. Also, as previously pointed out by McKoon and 
Ratcliff (1981), this type of inference is not necessary 
for comprehension.
Next, examine one of the implicit test paragraphs 
utilized by Miller (1980) and adapted from Keenan and 
Kintsch (1974): "A burning cigarette was carelessly
discarded. The fire destroyed many acres of virgin 
forest." The subjects' task was then to respond true or 
false to the question "The cigarette started a fire." Is 
this not a case of a backward inference? Most certainly 
"The cigarette started a fire" forms a connection between 
the two sentences. It would, therefore, be a backward 
inference and would be predicted by Singer and Ferreira 
(1983) to be made at encoding (as was found).
In a series of three experiments, Singer and Ferreira
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(1983) revealed that their adult subjects (college 
students) drew backward consequence inferences more 
reliably than forward consequence inferences. As 
materials, they constructed four sets of 11-sentence short 
stories. Within each of the four stories, two forward 
inferences and two backward inferences could be drawn. The 
backward inferences were prompted using a companion 
sentence (backward inference-inducing) that stated an 
outcome of the previous sentence, analogous to Miller’s
(1980) implicit sentences. The subjects' task was to 
respond true or false as quickly as they could to questions 
regarding the two types of inferences (see Table 1). It 
was found that that the backward inferences had a 
significantly lower overall response latency compared to 
the forward inferences. This would imply that the backward 
inferences were made at encoding while the forward 
inferences were only drawn at retrieval.
If we assume that this methodology has merit (and I 
believe it does), then another argument can be made that it 
also helps account for the discrepant findings in the 
children's reading literature. Recall that the results of 
Kail et al. (1977) were at variance with those of Paris and 
his associates (Paris & Lindauer, 1976; Paris et al.,
1977; Paris & Upton, 1976) in that Kail et al. found that 
the ability to respond to inference questions did not
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TABLE 1
Singer and Ferreira's "Spy Story"
Sentence Sentence Funct ion
Bob the spy read a report by the 
fire.
Fi H e r
A rock flew through the windowpane. Forward inference
Bob read a not attached to the rock Filler
He quickly threw his report in the 
f ire.
Backward inference
The ashes floated up the chimney. 
Next he called the airline.
Backward
Filler
inference- 
induc ing
He placed the coded sugar cube in 
water.
Backward inference
He poured the clear liquid into the 
drain.
Backward inference- 
induc ing
Bob left and flew to a tropical 
resort.
Filler
He sat all the next day in the sun. Forward inference
But Bob knew he was not safe here. Filler
(Singer & Ferreira, 1983, p. 445)
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improve with age in terms of either accuracy or response 
latency. While it might justifiably be argued that the 
discrepant results were due to Paris and associates' use of 
either cued recall or question accuracy and Kail et al.'s 
use of response latency, this cannot be the sole cause.
Kail et al. also studied accuracy of responses, and the 
accuracy results agreed with the response latency results 
in that the inference-drawing ability did not improve 
monotonically with age. As a result, I will advance the 
argument that the discrepant results are due simply to the 
type of inference that was studied in the opposing 
experiments.
As noted earlier, Kail et al. studied two types of 
inferences - transitive and contextual. Examining 
contextual inferences first, I argue that they are 
analogous to backward inferences; that they form a 
connection between the first and second sentences. Kail et 
al.'s example was that "Mary was playing a game" and "She 
was hit by a bat." The appropriate inference was then "Mary 
was playing baseball." By using Singer and Ferreira's 
(1983) definition of a backward inference, "Mary was 
playing baseball" does form a connection between the two 
test sentences, and without it, comprehension would not be 
possible. The premise "She was hit by a bat" is even 
analogous to Singer and Ferreira's backward
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inference-inducing sentences, because without it, the 
appropriate inference could not even be made.
While the argument would appear to be the strongest 
for contextual inferences, I believe a case can also be 
made for the transitive inferences. Again, Kail et al.'s 
two example inferences were "The bird is inside the cage" 
and "The cage is under the table." The appropriate 
inference was, therefore, "The bird is under the table." As 
with contextual inferences, the second premise could not be 
understood unless the appropriate inference was drawn; in
other words, a connection was drawn between the two 
premises by the appropriate inference, and that connection, 
as defined by Singer and Ferreira, would be termed a 
backward inference. As Thorndyke (1976) noted, without the 
appropriate inference in this case, context could not be 
established.
If this argument is accepted, it could be that Kail et 
al.'s results simply reflect the drawing of backward 
inferences, which are hypothesized to be drawn at encoding. 
It may be that since backward inferences enhance the 
coherence of a message and ensure comprehension, that they 
should appear developmentally earlier in the young child 
than should forward inferences. It should by now be 
apparent that the stimulus materials of Paris and 
associates allowed the drawing of only forward inferences.
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This was assured by the single-sentence stimulus materials 
used. In the one study of the three that did utilize 
stories (Paris & Upton, 1976), at least in the one example 
listed, nothing analogous to a backward inference-inducing 
sentence was present. Without such an inference-inducing 
sentence, the inferences drawn would have had to be forward 
inferences.
Although I believe that Singer and Ferreira's 
distinction of inferences can be fruitfully applied to Kail 
et al.'s stimulus materials, there is still a basic 
difference between their two specific types of inferences 
that needs to be made. While the two studies' stimulus 
materials can be somewhat equated in terms of forward and 
backward inferences, this is not to say that the forward 
and backward inferences were the same. Singer and Ferreira 
studied inferences about consequences which simply may not 
be the same as contextual or transitive inferences.
Indeed, Singer and Ferreira made this point in the first
paragraph of their article. While the methodology of
forward versus backward inferences provides a useful 
distinction, it should not be implied that it replaces the 
concept of different types of inferences (e.g., 
consequences, presuppositions, implied instruments, etc.). 
It should be noted that from this point on, backward 
inferences will be referred to as bridging inferences. The
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term "bridging inference" appears to describe more 
accurately the type of inference that is being made. It is 
an inference that establishes a connection (a "bridge") 
between a preceding and a subsequent sentence, thereby 
contributing to coherence. In addition, in place of the 
term "backward inference-inducing sentence," the term 
"bridge-mate" will be used. "Bridge-mate" has the 
advantage of being shorter than "backward 
inference-inducing sentence" while still retaining its 
descriptive value.
Although the distinction of forward and bridging 
inferences does seem to have merit, a recent article 
(Garrod & Sanford, 1981) cautions that bridging inferences 
are not always necessary. In many cases, Garrod and 
Sanford argue, certain words in a sentence are decomposed 
into their implied entities as soon as they are 
encountered. Garrod and Sanford used verbs that strongly 
implied certain entities (for example, the verb "dressed" 
implies the presence of "clothes"). The time it took a 
subject to read a final sentence from a three sentence 
phrase was measured in one of two conditions: The entity
had either been explicitly stated previously or it had only 
been implied. Reaction time to questions concerning the 
passages was also measured. The results showed that there 
were no differences in either the reading times for the
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final sentences or the reaction times to the questions. 
Garrod and Sanford interpreted these results as meaning 
that the verbs were decomposed as they were encountered, 
and thus, bridging was unnecessary. Supposedly, this 
accounted for the lack of a significant difference in the 
reaction times. Garrod and Sanford proposed the term 
"focus" to identify the currently active portion of memory 
represented by the decomposition of the various verbs. 
Explicit focus refers to those items stated explicitly 
while implicit focus denotes those entities implied by the 
verbs. Garrod and Sanford argued that the results of their 
experiment supported a notion of "primary processing," 
where no inferential bridge was needed and referents were 
mapped directly onto their decomposed memory 
representation. Garrod and Sanford further argued, 
however, that there are instances in which primary 
processing sometimes fails (as evidenced by their second 
experiment) and the search for an inferential bridge then 
becomes necessary (secondary processing). In other words, 
it is not that bridging does not ever occur, but simply 
that there are instances in which it is unnecessary. A 
look at Singer and Ferreira’s (1983) materials, however, 
reveals that their inferences would not be influenced by 
primary processing; the search for a bridge would still be 
necessary. Singer and Ferreira did not utilize verbs where
35
an entity was implied, and as a result, decomposition could 
not have occurred.
The question as to why bridging inferences would be 
drawn at encoding could justifiably be asked at this point. 
Wherein does the difference lie between the two types of 
inferences that one is reliably drawn during encoding while 
the other is not? Singer and Ferreira (1983) argued that 
the difference most probably stems from human information 
processing limitations. But they did not elaborate upon 
this statement, so the reader is unsure of their 
implication. It might be reasonable to argue that, at 
least as regards inferences about consequences, while 
forward inferences are highly probable, they are not 
necessarily true. Take, for example, the forward inference 
cited earlier. While ’’shovel" is a reasonable instrument 
for the action "cleared the snow from the stairs," it 
certainly is not the only possible one. "Broom," for 
example, could be an equally reasonable instrument for that 
particular action. Given this assumption, it would not be 
surprising that forward inferences are not drawn at 
encoding. If this were true, it might produce errors later 
if "shovel" had been encoded and "broom" was the actual 
intended inference. This explanation could not, however, 
account for all of the findings.
In another of Singer and Ferreira’s stories, the
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forward inference was "The rock flew through the 
windowpane." The question asked of subjects was then "Did 
the windowpane break?" In this instance, the fact that the 
windowpane broke would have to be true. Another 
possibility stems from a methodological issue. It could be 
that inferences, whether forward or bridging, are not drawn 
until needed for comprehension. In Singer and Ferreira’s 
methodology, their backward inference-inducing sentences 
(our bridge-mates) "forced" the inference to made so that 
comprehension was ensured. On the other hand, their 
forward inferences did not need to be made to ensure 
comprehension. In other words, it may be that bridging 
inferences are drawn at encoding because they are needed 
for text comprehension, unlike forward inferences, which 
are basically optional. If this argument is accepted, 
however, it gives rise to questions of the validity of the 
forward/bridging inference distinction as it pertains to 
the encoding versus retrieval debate. If inferences are 
not drawn until needed for comprehension, and the 
bridge-mate sentences "force" the inference to be made, is 
this truly evidence for the inference having been made at 
encoding?
The issue revolves around the definition and use of 
the term "encoding." Does the inference-at-encoding 
position argue that an inference has to be drawn the exact
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moment it is implied in the text, or is possible that it 
can be drawn at a later time, although still while reading 
the text? In other words, does the encoding position 
demand that the inference "The cigarette started a fire" 
was drawn when the sentence "A burning cigarette was 
carelessly discarded" was encountered, or is it ambiguous 
enough to allow that the inference was drawn at a later 
moment in the text base, as when the second sentence "The 
fire destroyed many acres of virgin forest" was then 
encountered? In order to answer the question, the 
definition of the encoding position needs to be made more 
explicit, and to date, this issue has not been addressed.
It is a crucial methodological issue. Even if it can be 
argued that the use of bridge-mate sentences does not 
necessarily imply that the inference was made at encoding, 
the methodological point does help explain the 
discrepancies noted in some of the previous work.
There were two main goals of this study. The first 
was to attempt to determine at what age the ability to draw 
bridging inferences at encoding develops (if, indeed, 
bridging inferences are found to be made at encoding). 
Therefore, additional light could be shed on many of the 
discrepancies noted in some of the earlier children’s 
inference literature. The second goal was to replicate the 
findings of Singer and Ferreira (1983), but with an
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extended range of test materials. Singer and Ferreira used 
only four stories from which two inferences of each type 
could be drawn (bridging or forward) for a total comparison 
of eight bridging inferences against eight possible forward 
inferences. In this study, second, fifth, and eighth grade 
children, in addition to college undergraduates, were used. 
A total of eight experimental stories for a test of 16 
bridging inferences against 16 forward inferences were also 
used. My hypothesis was that there would be an overall 
main effect for inference type, with the bridging 
inferences showing shorter response latencies and fewer 
errors compared to the forward inferences. In addition, I 
suspected an age effect to be present, which I would then 
be able to tease apart to see if and when the ability to 
draw bridging inferences develops.
Briefly, this study presented four different groups of 
subjects with a total of eight experimental paragraphs. 
Within each paragraph, two forward and two bridging 
inferences were able to be made. At the end of each story, 
eight questions were asked related to the drawing of the 
forward and bridging inferences. Reaction time and error 
rates to the truth or falsity of each question were then 
measured as an indication of whether a particular inference 
type was more reliably drawn during encoding or retrieval. 
If bridging inferences are made at encoding while forward
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inferences are not, as was hypothesized, then the response 
latency to the bridging inference questions should have 
been significantly shorter than the response latency to the 
forward inference questions.
Method
Norms
A preliminary norming study was conducted to identify 
a pool of events which have consequences agreed upon by 
most people. One hundred naive introductory psychology 
students were asked to write a brief description of the 
most likely outcome or consequence of events described in 
200 single sentences.
Each of the 200 stimulus sentences had a consequence 
that the experimenter believed many people would agree 
with. An example (taken from Singer and Ferreira, 1983) 
would be the sentence "An egg falls on the floor," for 
which the expected consequence concerns the breaking of the 
egg. Following Singer and Ferreira's suggestion, subjects 
were given credit for agreeing with the consequence if 
their answer (1) stated it directly, (2) replaced it with a 
synonym, or (3) expressed the expected consequence plus 
some additional ideas (e.g., the egg breaks and makes a 
mess).
Thirteen test narratives were originally constructed. 
As a cursory check, the 52 inference sentences used in
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these narratives were read singly, both out of context and 
in a random order, to ten second grade children who did not 
participate in the actual experiment. Each child was asked 
to tell the experimenter what he/she thought was the most 
likely outcome of each sentence. This was done to ensure 
that the inferences being drawn by the adult subjects in 
the norming study were also valid for the youngest 
subjects. This check resulted in some stories receiving 
good overall agreement while other stories turned out to be 
quite poor. The "poor” stories generally had lower 
agreement on all of their inference sentences, in contrast 
to the "good" stories which contained a majority of 
well-agreed upon inference sentences. Therefore, the eight 
stories receiving the most overall agreement were used. 
Actually, two of the stories had to be modified somewhat to 
ensure that their inference sentences reached the 80 
percent criterion level. Well-agreed upon sentences from 
stories that did not receive much agreement were 
substituted for those sentences in "good" stories that were 
rather poor. Some of the wording was also changed to make 
the stories more comprehensible. As a result, the 
inference sentences embedded in the eight experimental 
narratives all reached the 80 percent criterion level, at 
least with the ten second grade children tested.
Materials
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The materials consisted of eight test stories, each 
story being 11 sentences long. Each story consisted of two 
forward inference sentences, two bridging inference 
sentences, two bridge-mate sentences, and five filler 
sentences, two of which began and ended each story, with 
the remaining three inserted between the inference 
sentences. The forward and bridging inference sentences 
were constructed from the ones chosen in the norming 
procedure, and in the case of a bridging inference, a 
bridge-mate sentence was added in order to ensure that the 
inference would be made.
For each story, eight questions were written. Four of 
the questions interrogated the experimental sentences and 
were intended to be answered "yes.” The other four 
questions interrogated the filler sentences and were 
intended to be answered "no.” It was hoped that this 
manipulation would eliminate any response bias. The eight 
questions for each story were assigned to a single random 
order.
Two experimental lists were used. In List 1, the four 
experimental sentences in each story were randomly assigned 
to the forward and bridging inference conditions. List 2 
consisted of the same four experimental sentences, but the 
assignment of forward versus bridging inference conditions 
was simply reversed. Thus, across the two lists, each
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experimental sentence occurred once in each condition 
(forward or bridging inference).
In addition to the story materials, 15 sentences were 
written to be used as an indication of each subject’s 
reading speed. In this way, reading speed could be 
covaried out of the analysis in order to control for the 
possibility that the younger subjects take longer to answer 
questions simply because they are slower readers. Three of 
the sentences constituted practice with the remaining 12 
being experimental. A question followed each sentence, 
each question testing either knowledge of the subject, 
object, or verb of the preceding sentence. Five questions 
of each type were therefore used, comprising a total of 15 
questions.
Subj ects
A total of 120 subjects were tested, 30 from each 
grade level. The subjects consisted of equal numbers of 
males and females from second, fifth, and eighth grade in 
addition to college undergraduates. The mean age of the 
groups were: grade 2, mean = 8 yr. 0 month, range 7-5 to
8-10; grade 5, mean = 11 yr. 1 month, range 10-7 to 12-1; 
grade 8, mean = 13 yr. 11 month, range 13-5 to 14-9; and 
college undergraduates, mean = 22 yr. 7 month, range 18-6 
to 33-5. The school-age children were drawn from the 
District 66 Public School system while the undergraduates
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were drawn from introductory psychology students at the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha. The only requirements for 
participation were that the subjects speech English as 
their native language and not be eligible for any special 
educational needs. None of the subjects participated in 
the norming procedure.
Procedure
Each session was conducted individually with each 
subject. The sentences were displayed on a 22 cm. video 
monitor screen with the subjects seated at a comfortable 
distance of their choice in front of the screen. The 
experimental events were controlled by a Commodore PET 2001 
Series Professional Computer.
Informed consent forms were sent home for parental 
approval with each school-age child by their respective 
teachers. Each child that chose to participate was also 
requested to sign a simpler version of the form, which was 
read aloud by the experimenter. In addition, the college 
undergraduates who participated in either the norming study 
or the actual experiment also signed informed consent 
forms.
Before presentation of the stories, each subject's 
reading speed was measured. The subjects read silently 15 
sentences, each individually, from the computer screen. 
Three of the sentences constituted practice with the
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remaining 12 being experimental. Before each session, the 
subjects were instructed to read each sentence as rapidly 
as possible while still retaining comprehension and were 
told that they would have to answer a question about each 
sentence as soon as they had finished reading it. In this 
manner, comprehension was doubly stressed. Preceding each 
sentence, a dot appeared, centered in the screen, which 
acted as a prompt for attention. The dot remained on the 
screen for five seconds. A sentence then followed the 
prompt, also centered in the screen. The onset of the 
sentence on the screen started a millisecond timer in the 
computer. The subjects then read the sentence and pressed 
a button on the response box with the index finger on their 
dominant hand. The button press stopped the timer after 
each sentence. The experimenter then read a question 
following each sentence, testing memory for either the 
subject, object, or verb of the preceding sentence. The 
subjects responded verbally to the experimenter. Incorrect 
or incomplete responses by the subject prompted the 
experimenter to tell the subject to slow down. In 
addition, he or she was then told that understanding the 
story was as important as speed. After each response, the 
experimenter pressed the space on the computer and the 
prompting dot reappeared followed by the next sentence. 
Elapsed reading time was then recorded by the computer for
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each sentence.
Each subject then saw nine stories, the first of which 
constituted practice and was the "Spy Story" drawn from 
Singer and Ferreira's (1983) article and qiven in Table 1. 
For each story, the subjects were asked to read each 
sentence carefully and then answer the questions 
appropriately. The sentences in the stories and the 
questions were displayed one by one. Before each story, a 
fixation point appeared in the middle of the screen for 5 
seconds. The fixation point was then replaced by a prompt, 
also centered in the screen, which read "Story" (or 
"Practice Story," in the case of the practice session). 
After a 1 second delay, the 11 sentences constituting the 
story then appeared in succession. The subject had control 
over the presentation rate by pressing either of the two 
response keys. Although it would have been advantageous to 
have a constant presentation rate, the rate of reading 
speed for the second grade children varied so much that it 
was impossible to arrive at a speed that would have been 
fair for all subjects. It would have either been too fast 
for the second graders or too slow for the college 
undergraduates, thereby allowing them to read each sentence 
more than once. Therefore, each subject had control over 
the presentation rate, with the stipulation that he or she 
read each sentence only once.
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The questions were then presented next. They were 
preceded by a prompt, centered in the middle of the screen, 
which read "Questions” (or "Practice Questions during the 
practice session). The prompt remained on the screen for 5 
seconds,. The questions then followed the prompt and the 
timer started immediately after the presentation of each 
question on the screen (the timer was actually an internal 
component of the program). The subjects were asked to 
respond as quickly as possible without error. Each 
question remained on the screen until the subject answered 
it, after which it disappeared and was replaced, one second 
later, by the next question.
The subjects were told to respond "yes" with the index 
finger of one hand, and "no" with the index finger of the 
other. The subjects were reminded to keep their fingers 
resting on the response keys to facilitate responding. The 
subjects were assigned, on the basis of their dominant 
hand, to use either their left hand or right hand for the 
"yes" key. The responses and response times were then 
recorded automatically to the nearest millisecond by the 
computer and stored for future access. After each set of 
eight questions, the screen went blank for 1 second and the 
story prompt then reappeared, followed 5 seconds later by 
the next story. In this fashion, all eight stories were 
responded to. At the completion of each experimental
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session, each subject was debriefed. The computer then 
printed out all responses and reaction times which were 
written down by the experimenter.
Results
Reaction Time
The adjusted mean reaction times (adjusted by the 
reading speed covariate) for each type of inference, list, 
and grade are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The reaction time 
data were subjected to a grade (4) X sex (2) X list (2) X 
type (2) unweighted means repeated measures analysis of 
covariance (harmonic mean per cell = 7.18). A quasi-F 
procedure (min F') was utilized, based on Clark’s (1973) 
suggestion that a quasi-F statistic should be computed when 
lanaguage-based materials are used. The min F ’ quasi-F 
statistic is a conservative estimate utilizing both the F^
(subjects-random) and F£ (stories-random) statistics in its 
computation. The logic of its use hinges on the 
generalizability of a particular set of findings. With its 
use, results can be generalized to both a new sample of 
subjects and a new sample of language-materials. In the 
first analysis, subjects were treated as a random effect 
with reading speed (words per minute) as the covariate. 
Inference type (forward or bridging) was within-subjects. 
Between-subjects factors were grade (second, fifth, eighth, 
and college undergraduate), sex, and list. For the
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TABLE 2
Adjusted Mean Reaction Times in Msec to the 
Inference Questions - Both Lists
Diff 
-76 
-90 
-45
14
* Denotes significance at p < .001 
(Fwd - Forward Inferences)
(Brdg - Bridging Inferences)
(Diff - Forward RT minus Bridging RT)
List 1 List 2
Fwd Brdg Diff Fwd Brdq
Grade 2 4311 3564 747* 4051 4127
Grade 5 3030 2468 562* 2650 2740
Grade 8 2603 2099 504* 2217 2262
College 2571 2204 367* 2314 2300
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Table 3
Mean Reaction Times in Msec to the 
Inference Questions Collapsed Across Lists
Combined Lists
Forward Bridging
Grade 2 4181 3845
Grade 5 2840 2604
Grade 8 2410 2180
College 2442 2252
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analysis treating stories as a random effect, all factors 
were within-stories. In addition, omega squared values 
were computed for all significant effects, using the sum of 
squares and mean squares values from the appropriate 
analysis treating subjects as a random effect. The main 
effects of grade and inference type were significant: 
grade, min F'(3,115) = 18.23, p < .001, cj2 = .297; type, 
min F'(l,ll) = 9.78, p < .01, = .019. With regard to
the grade effect, there were no significant interactions. 
The data revealed that each succeeding grade level 
responded faster than the preceding younger group with the 
exception of the college undergraduates. The 
undergraduates were actually slower than the eighth 
graders, although this differences was not significant. 
Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons indicated that all of the 
differences among the school-age children were significant 
(ps < .01). The main effect for type is tempered somewhat 
by a significant interaction between list and type, 
min F'(l,12) = 17.28, p < .01, CJ2 - .029. Simple 
comparisons performed on the data revealed that the 
bridging inferences were only significantly faster than the 
forward inferences for list 1 F(l,59) = 107.10, p < .001.
In fact, the bridging inferences were slightly slower than 
the forward inferences for list 2. When all the 
experimental manipulations were combined, including the
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nonsignificant Fs, they accounted for 34.6 percent of the 
total variance.
Error Percentages
The mean error percentage rates for inference type, 
list, and grade are listed in Table 4. A grade (4) X sex 
(2) X list (2) X type (2) analysis of variance was 
performed. For the subjects analysis, inference type was 
again within-subjects while the three factors of grade, 
sex, and list were all between-subjects. All factors were 
within-stories for the analysis treating stories as a 
random effect. Omega squared values were again computed 
for all significant treatment effects, utilizing the 
procedure outlined previously. The main effects of grade 
and type were again significant: grade, 
min F'(3,75) = 6.18, p < .001, = .117; type,
min F'(l,17) = 30.13, p < .001, = .122. Newman-Keuls
multiple comparisons performed on the grade data indicated 
that second graders made significantly more errors than all 
other grade levels, with no other significant differences 
(p < .01). The type effects reflect the finding that more 
errors were made to forward inference questions than to 
bridging inference questions. In addition, there was a 
significant three-way interaction: grade by sex by list,
min F ' (3,112) = 3.26, p < .025, <*>2 = . 039. This 
interaction was further analyzed by collapsing across
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Grade 2
Grade 5
Grade 8
College
TABLE 4
Mean Proportion of Errors 
for Each Type of Inference Question
List 1 List 2
Forvard Bridging Forward Br idg ing
.31 .24 .44 .32
.20 .16 .28 .11
.23 .15 .30 .15
.23 .18 .30 .09
53
inference type and comparing the sex effect against the 
list effect at each of the four grade levels. At the 
second grade level, only list was found to be a significant 
factor, F(l,26) =6.63, £ < .025, and the data revealed 
that all second grade children made significantly more 
errors to list 2 than to list 1. At the fifth grade level,
both list and the sex by list interaction were significant:
list, F(l,26) = 5.07, £ < .05; and sex by list,
F(l,26) = 4.32, £ < .05. Taken together, the data from the 
analysis indicated that while list 1 questions had 
significantly fewer errors than list 2 questions, this 
effect was attributable completely to the males. At the 
eighth grade level, only the sex by list interaction 
reached significance, F(l,26) = 4.27, £ < .05. In this 
case, however, only the females made fewer errors to list 1 
questions rather than to list 2 questions (a finding
directly opposite that of the fifth grade children).
Finally, at the college level, none of the effects reached 
significant levels. Once again, the variance accounted for 
by all of the experimental manipulations was calculated.
The value obtained, 33.8 percent, is quite consistent with 
the reaction time value.
In order to assess whether the second grade children 
in the study were drawing the two types of inferences 
significantly more often than chance (.50), t tests were
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conducted. The error rates for both forward and bridging 
inferences were found to be significantly less than chance; 
forward, t(29) = -4.63, Y  = .375, 2 < *001? bridging, 
t(29) = -6.51, Y  = ,279, £ < .001. In order to rule out
the possibility that the subjects had simply developed a 
response bias to answering "yes," the error rates to the 
filler questions (which required a "no” response) were also 
analyzed. The filler question errors were also found to be 
significantly below chance, t(29) = -24.52, Y  = .105,
£ < .001, implying that the above chance performance on 
correctly answering inference questions was not a function 
of a response bias.
Discussion
Based on the results of the analyses, it would appear 
that the subjects at all of the grade levels successfully 
drew the inferences. Even the second grade children drew 
both types of inferences, as exhibited by their greater 
than chance performance. Inference-drawing ability did 
increase with age, however, as the two main effects for 
grade indicate. In addition, the bridging inferences were 
responded to significantly faster than the forward 
inferences, although this effect was completely due to list 
1. Again, this was true for the second grade children as 
well. Both the reaction time and error rates indicated 
that bridging inferences are drawn more easily than forward
55
inferences.
Although the type effect did reach significance in the 
min F' analysis, its omega squared value for the reaction 
time data was in the low range of effect strength, 
according to Cohen's (1977) interpretation. While this 
manipulation did not account for as much variance as was 
hypothesized, perhaps this is simply due to the fact that 
at all grade levels, both types of inferences were being 
drawn relatively easily. Although it will be argued that 
the bridging inferences in this study were drawn at 
encoding while the forward inferences were not, this does 
not imply that forward inferences are extremely slow to be 
drawn, and are only arrived at after much deliberation. In 
other words, while bridging inferences were significantly 
faster than forward inferences at all grade levels, forward 
inferences apparently were still being made quite easily, 
possibly accounting for the relatively small strength of 
the effect, as measured by omega squared. The type effect 
is actually outlined more clearly, however, in the error 
rate analyses. For both the subjects-random and 
stories-random analyses, the omega squared values revealed 
that approximately 12 percent of the total systematic 
variance was accounted for by the inference type 
manipulation. Due to the consistency of the error rate 
data, as compared to the reaction time data, perhaps the
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small omega squared value for inference type in the 
reaction time data should be interpreted cautiously.
An uninterpretable finding from this study was the 
presence of the significant list by type interaction when 
reaction time was the dependent variable. For some reason, 
the list 2 bridging inferences were drawn no faster than 
the forward inferences. Upon examining the bridging 
inferences for the two lists, no glaring inconsistency is 
readily apparent. Table 2 shows that for list 2, the 
forward inferences were drawn more quickly and the bridging 
inferences were drawn more slowly than for list 1. The 
interaction is not readily interpretable, and it could 
simply be that a Type I error has occurred. Indeed, this 
assumption is plausible given that the interaction was only* 
significant for the reaction time analysis, but not for the 
error rate analysis. Additionally, the omega squared value 
for the effect was quite small, indicating that it is of 
little practical significance. In light of these facts, 
the interaction will not be discussed further.
Another uninterpretable finding from this study was 
the significant three-way interaction of grade, sex, and 
list for the error rates. The practical importance of the 
effect, however, is even harder to determine than the list 
by type effect. At the fifth grade level, males made more 
errors on list 2 questions than on list 1 questions. This
57
pattern was completely reversed at the eighth grade level, 
with only the females making more errors to list 2 
questions than to list 1 questions. Due to the 
uninterpretable nature of this finding, the most plausible 
explanation is that a Type I error was again obtained.
Probably the most compelling reason to argue for a 
Type I error in both of the significant interaction effects 
is that each was significant for only one of the analyses 
(either reaction time or error rate), never both. Coupled 
with the facts that the omega squared values were 
relatively small and that the pattern of obtained results 
does not make any intuitive sense, one is left with the 
argument that two Type I errors have occurred.
The findings of this study would seem to contradict 
Paris and his associates' claim (Paris & Lindauer, 1976, 
1977; Paris et al., 1977; Paris & Upton, 1976), as well 
as Dreher's (1981) that second grade children can draw 
inferences, but do not spontaneously generate them while 
reading a prose passage. If inferences of neither type had 
been drawn, it would have been expected that no significant 
differences between the two types of questions would have 
been seen, for either reaction time or error rate. In 
fact, this pattern of results did not occur. Both the 
reaction time data and the error rate data supported the 
hypothesis that bridging inferences were drawn at the
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second grade level. In addition, if inferences had not 
been drawn by the second grade children, the percentage of 
inference questions answered correctly should have been no 
greater than chance. In fact, however, the error rates for 
both forward and -bridging inferences were considerably 
below chance, with the bridging inferences having 
significantly fewer errors than the forward.
While these results would appear to refute Paris and 
his associates' (Paris & Lindauer, 1976, 1977; Paris et 
al., 1977; Paris & Upton, 1976) contention that second 
grade children do not spontaneously generate inferences, 
they also contradict Kail et al.'s (1977) conclusion that 
there is no developmental progression between the second 
and fifth grades in the ability to draw inferences. In the 
earlier discussion of the discrepancy between Kail et al.'s 
findings and those of Paris and his associates, it was 
argued that the differences were probably largely due to 
the types of inferences that the children were asked to 
make (e. g., transitive inferences, presuppositions, 
contextual inferences, instrumental inferences). The 
materials used in the present study resemble those of the 
Kail et al. study much more closely than they do any of the 
Paris studies. Based on this fact, the finding that the 
fifth grade children made significantly fewer errors and 
answered all quest ions significantly faster is of
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considerable interest. Both findings directly contradict 
Kail et al.’s conclusions and suggest the existence of a 
developmental trend in the ease of drawing inferences 
between the second and fifth grade.
The difference in results between the Kail et 
al. study and the present one may be due to the use of 
longer passages in this study compared to Kail et al.'s use 
of three sentence passages. This argument is also 
supported by the only other study discussed which used 
passages of comparable length - namely, the study of Paris 
and Upton (1976), who found an increase in 
inference-drawing ability between the ages of six and ten 
with passages ranging from 13 to 16 sentences. Whatever 
the reason, the grade effect, as exhibited by both reaction 
time and error rates, must not be overlooked. Grade 
accounted for large percentages of the total systematic 
variance, in both the reaction time and error rate analyses. 
The omega squared values for both error rate values 
(subjects-random and stories-random) were in the medium 
range of effect strength (Cohen, 1977) while the omega 
squared values for both reaction time analyses were in the 
large range of effect strength (Cohen, 1977).
With regard to the error rates, the Newman-Keuls 
multiple comparisons revealed that the largest and only 
significant decrease in errors was between the second and
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fifth grade. Reaction time, however, reached its 
asymptotic level around the eighth grade, as evidenced by 
the lack of a significant difference between the eighth 
grade children and the college undergraduates. While the 
second grade/fifth grade difference has been emphasized, 
this is not to imply that the second grade/fifth grade 
difference is any more important than the fifth 
grade/eighth grade difference. The second grade/fifth 
grade difference has been emphasized due solely to its 
importance in contesting the conclusions of the Kail et 
al. study.
The argument concerning the existence of a 
developmental increase in the ability to draw inferences 
between the second and fifth grade is not as important 
theoretically as the finding (previously unsuspected) that 
second graders can make spontaneous inferences. Although 
the inferential process was not perfect in the present 
study - both reaction time and the error rates for the 
inference questions changed with age - second graders were 
still successful at drawing the inferences themselves. 
Performance for both forward and bridging inferences was 
significantly better than chance.
The issue of when each type of inference is drawn 
(encoding vs. retrieval) has also been clarified somewhat 
by the present results. While virtually none of the
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developmental literature has concerned itself with this 
issue, much of the adult literature has. Indeed, Miller 
(1980), on the basis of his review and his own research, 
concluded that much of the inference literature provided 
support for the inference-at-encoding view. The work of 
Singer and Ferreira (1983) pointed to a conclusion that 
such a general statement is unwarranted, however. Their 
work posited that backward inferences (our bridging 
inferences) were drawn at encoding while forward inferences 
were not drawn until test time (the inference-at-retrieval 
view). The results of the present study lend support to 
Singer and Ferreira's conclusion, while extending it 
further to include school age children as well. If both 
types of inferences were being drawn at the same time 
(either during encoding or retrieval) then there should 
have been no difference between reaction times. Such was 
not the case, however. Due to the finding that the 
bridging inference questions were responded to faster, the 
implication is that they were drawn as the text was being 
comprehended, and thus, were stored as part of the memory 
trace for that text.
This study has helped resolve much of the ambiguity 
surrounding both the adult and developmental inference 
literature. First, it would appear that children as young 
as seven years of age can spontaneously generate inferences
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as they read a prose passage. While this ability continues 
to develop with age in terms of speed of inference 
generation and increasing accuracy, it does at least 
reflect that second grade-aged children can generate their 
own inferences, a finding clearly at odds with the earlier 
research. Secondly, the determination of the locus of 
inference generation (encoding vs. retrieval) does not 
necessarily represent an either/or decision, as many 
previous authors have implied. Inferences might best be 
thought of as consisting of two types: (1) Those that are
almost demanded by the text, without which the text would 
appear disjoint (bridging inferences); and (2) Those that 
are certainly implied by the text but not necessary for 
comprehension (forward inferences). Based on the results 
of the present study, bridging inferences are argued to be 
drawn at encoding while forward inferences are not drawn 
until needed, at retrieval.
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Appendix A
Norming Study Informed Consent Form
CONSENT FORM
You are invited to participate in a norming study 
designed to reveal which of a given set of sentences 
receives the highest agreement in terms of their most 
likely consequences. As a participant in this study, you 
will simply be asked to indicate what you feel is the most 
likely consequence of the action described in each 
sentence, for a total of 200 sentences. At the conclusion 
of the experimental session, the investigator will describe 
the purpose of the norming study and its possible 
importance. At this time, you will have an opportunity to 
discuss the reasoning behind the study and its possible 
benefits to psychological knowledge.
Your responses will be kept confidential. Your name 
will not be associated in any way with the information you 
provide.
No significant risks are involved in this study beyond 
those of everyday life. The benefits for participation in 
this study are simply those of having an opportunity to see 
how a research project of this type is conducted, and to 
possibly learn something about an area of current research 
interest in cognitive psychology. We cannot promise you 
that you will receive any benefits other than those 
discussed here. Should you decide to participate in this 
study, your participation may satisfy one of several 
options available to you for obtaining extra course credit 
in your psychology course, as described to you by your 
instructor. However, you do have the option of performing 
alternate activities for such credit should you choose not 
to participate.
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your 
decision whether or not to participate in this survey will 
not affect your relationship with the University of 
Nebraska, nor your participation in any of your classes in 
psychology. If you decide to participate, you are free to 
withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at 
any time. Furthermore, you have the right to withdraw your
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Appendix A - Continued
data from this study following completion of the 
questionnaire should you decide to do so. If you have any 
questions, please ask the investigator now. If you have 
any additional questions later, Mark Casteel, who many be 
reached at the phone number listed below, will be happy to 
answer them.
YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO 
PARTICIPATE. YOUR SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE 
DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED 
ABOVE. YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS FORM TO KEEP.
Date Participant’s Signature
Mark A. Casteel (554-2398)
Greg Simpson, Ph.D.
Investigator’s Signature
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Norming Study Questionnaire
Please read each sentence below carefully. After 
reading each sentence, please write underneath it what you 
feel the consequence of the action in the sentence would 
be. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these 
sentences and there is no time limit. This study is simply 
a norming study in which we wish to determine which of the 
below sentences have the most agreement in terms of their 
consequences. The results of this study will be used to 
prepare the materials needed in a later study. Please take 
this questionnaire seriously. While the sentences might 
seem simple-minded, the results to be obtained from them 
will be invaluable. This questionnaire will be kept 
completely anonymous, and you are under no obligation to 
complete it if you so choose.
If you choose not to participate in the study, your 
choice will in no way affect your relationship with the 
University of Nebraska, nor your participation in any of 
your classes in psychology.
EXAMPLE - The dog jumped into the lake.
For the most likely consequence, you might write "The dog 
got wet."
1. The pin was pushed into the balloon.
2. The rock flew through the window.
3. The paper was thrown into the fire.
4. The sugar cube was placed in the glass of water.
5. The egg was dropped on the floor.
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6. The tire ran over a nail.
7. The burning match was placed in a glass of water.
8. The sharp knife cut the finger.
9. The light switch was flipped up.
10. The boy turned on the flashlight.
11. The boy stepped on the banana peel.
12. the key was turned in the ignition of the car.
13. The man in the car put on its brakes.
14. The orange juice carton tipped over.
15. The lady stepped on the ant.
16. The lady forgot to wind her watch.
17. The mouse ran in front of the cat.
18. The boy pulled the fire alarm.
19. The girl's glasses fell to the cement.
20. The icecube was placed in the sun.
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21. The car ran over a cliff.
22. The ink pen was broken in two.
23. The boy put his hand into the fire.
24. The bag of sugar ripped while being carried.
25. The boy caught his pants on a nail.
26. The dog rolled in the mud.
27. The cake was put into the oven.
28. The woman was in the rain without an umbrella.
29. The man fell down the stairs.
30. The boy went to the barber.
31. The bread was put into the toaster.
32. The man dropped the radio.
33. The bowl of soup fell off the table.
34. The firecracker fell into the fire.
35. The mirror fell to the ground.
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36. The boy leaned far back in his chair.
37. The boy turned on the water faucet.
38. The dog saw the mailman.
39. The woman dropped her ring down the drain.
40. The child sat all day in the hot sun.
41. The grass seeds were planted in the ground.
42. The child ate as often as possible.
43. The curtain was pulled back from the window.
44. The child rubbed the magic lamp.
45. The knight stabbed the dragon with his sword.
46. The child hit the bell with a hammer.
47. The clown told the boy a joke.
48. The girl blew into the trumpet.
49. The princess kissed the frog.
50. The chicken sat on her egg.
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51. The duck was thrown into the water.
52. The boy sneezed into the candle.
53. The child put a penny into the gumball machine.
54. The child shook the bottle of soda pop.
55. The man told the child a ghost story.
56. The running man stepped on his shoestring.
57. The wind blew into the windmill.
58. The hamburger fell off the table by the hungry dog.
59. The baseball hit the lightbulb.
60. The dog saw the cat through the window.
61. The man pulled the trigger on the gun.
62. The man forgot to put gas in the car.
63. The boy tore the scab off of his knee.
64. The boy stepped on a piece of bubblegum.
65. The cookies were left in the oven too long.
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66. The cap was left off of the magic marker.
67. The woman ran over the paper clip with the vacuum 
cleaner.
68. The pillow ripped apart as it was picked up.
69. The batteries ran down in the toy car.
70. The man unplugged the television set.
71. The girl cut her hair into the bathroom sink.
72. The burglar cut the telephone wire.
73. The boy lost his balance looking into the deep well.
74. The gardener sprayed poison all over the weeds.
75. The rubber band was stretched too far.
76. The bear ate the poisonous berries.
77. The burglar lit the dynamite stick.
78. The girl got pepper up her nose.
79. The key was turned in the locked door.
80. The ladder tipped over as the boy was on the top step.
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81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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The father spanked the little boy very hard.
The mother patted 'the baby on the back after dinner.
The dragon opened his mouth wide and breathed hard.
The boy threw some popcorn into the fire.
The boy fell and hit his tooth on the cement.
The clown rang the doorbell and said "Trick or Treat."
The woman put too much soap into the washing machine.
The ghost sneaked up behind the girl and yelled "boo."
The horse bucked the cowboy.
The man shut the safe and spun the dial.
The mother hung her wash out on the sunny day.
The car's radiator ran out of water on the long trip.
Reaching for the ball, the boy slid in the grass.
The speedy arrow pierced the indian's heart.
The raw meat was left out under the hot sun.
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96. The man stood up in the canoe and waved
97. The cap was left off of the glue bottle.
98. The lid was left off of the soda pop bottle.
99. The doughnuts were left sitting out in the sun.
100. The karate expert hit the thick board.
101. The boy stuck his finger into the fan.
102. The boy got too close to the bumblebee.
103. The man ate the hot soup too fast.
104. The little boy ran toward the rabbit.
105. The girl landed on the trampoline.
106. The mosquito landed on the boy's arm.
107. The batteries were left in the flashlight for two
years.
108. The boy did not study for his hard test.
109. The woman left her keys in her car.
110. It rained all over the campfire.
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111. The boy threw his fishing line into the tree.
112. The fish saw the bug on the top of the lake.
113. The boy put too many groceries into the sack.
114. The shiny gun was left out in the rain.
115. The little boy told his father a lie.
116. The boy left his toy truck out in the rain.
117. The boy let the dog out without a leash.
118. The boy didn't wear enough heavy clothes on the cold
day.
119. The girl stepped out of the shower into the cold 
breeze.
120. The man listened to the boring speech.
121. The man bought his girlfriend a diamond ring.
122. The inner tube had a leak in it.
123. The girl got a terrible headache.
124. The boy got hit in the stomach with the football.
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125. The boy yelled at the sleeping baby.
126. The door of the dog’s cage was left open.
127. The airplane’s engine conked out.
128. The submarine fired a torpedo at the boat.
129. The water in the teakettle started boiling.
130. The watch fell off of the man’s arm into the lake.
131. The woman left the iron on her pants as she answered
the telephone.
132. The rabbit sneaked into the carrot patch through a 
fence hole.
133. The two boys each tugged at the map.
134. The fat boy jumped on the small bed.
135. The boy put the glass of water out into the snow.
136. The fat boy tried to slide down the chimney.
137. The mother put the butter into the hot skillet.
138. The boy dropped the brick on his toe.
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139. The boy kept his tadpoles for a year in the garage.
140. The girl spelled every word in her spelling bee
correct.
141. A spike was driven into the vampire's heart.
142. The man slept under the hole in the tent during the 
rainy night.
143. The girl turned the handle on the jack-in-the-box.
144. The man was late getting to his bus stop.
145. The mother put her hand on the fidgeting boy's knee.
146. The wind took the kite into the trees.
147. The girl pressed down too hard on her pencil.
148. The dog got a flea behind his ear.
149. The boy knocked down the wasp's nest.
150. The soldier pulled the pin on the grenade.
151. The boat had a hole in it.
152. The man struck the match on the side of the box.
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153. The mother sung a lullabye to her baby.
154. The cannonball was shot into the lake.
155. The little boy was clumsy with the sharp knife.
156. The woman poured dishsoap into the running water.
157. The secretary put the two pages into the stapler.
158. The swimming suit was untied as the girl jumped into 
the pool.
159. The girl tried to rollerskate for the first time
160. The leaf blew off of the tree into the the river
161. The steamroller ran over the boy's toy truck.
162. The boy flew his kite in the rainstorm.
163. The girl watched the sad movie.
164. The player hit the baseball over the fence.
165. The boy poured water onto the dirt.
166. The little boy touched the hot stove.
167. The lumberjack hit the tree with an axe.
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168. The man's billfold fell out of his pocket.
169. The bread was left out while the family went away.
170. The man dropped the magnet into the sack of nails.
171. The coyote sat out under the full moon.
172. The cowboy dug his spurs into the horse and said,
"Giddyup."
173. The boy stroked the cat as it sat on his lap.
174. The man threw the boomerang high into the air.
175. The boy pulled strongly on the worn out shoestring.
176. The hungry man stared at the delicious meat cooking.
177. The boy yelled out into the deep canyon.
178. The boy pulled open the rusty door of the haunted
house.
179. The girl played out in the cold without a coat or 
hat.
180. The magician stuck his hand into his magic hat.
181. The boy put his money into the candy machine.
83
Appendix B - Continued
182. Pinnochio told another lie.
183. The riverside house had a leaky basement.
184. The mouse ran to the cheese in the mousetrap.
185. The man and woman drank too much wine.
186. The burglar alarm rang as the robber opened the safe.
187. The storm blew down the town's powerlines.
188. The mother poured too much milk into her son’s glass.
189. The cigarette was dropped into the dry and brittle
forest.
190. The man put a dollar bill into the quarter change 
machine.
191. The boy picked up the melted chocolate bar.
192. The man tried to call the telephone that was off of
the hook.
193. The boy hit the baseball with the cracked bat.
194. The girl patted the friendly dog's head.
195. The man worked hard in the hot sun.
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196. The child accidentally let go of the balloon.
197. The driver of the car saw a cow in the road.
198. The boy lost his pet dog.
199. A puff of air hit the boy in the eyes.
200. The fish ate the worm on the hook.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.
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Parental Informed Consent Form
Dear Parents:
Your child has been invited to participate in a research 
project on children’s ability to infer outcomes or 
consequences from a story. The project will be conducted 
by Mark Casteel, a graduate student in developmental 
psychology, and Dr. Gregory Simpson, an Associate 
Professor in the UNO Psychology Department. Your child has 
been selected for possible participation only because he or 
she is a member of the school grades that we are studying: 
second, fifth, or eighth.
The study examines the developmental phenomenon of the 
ability to make inferences from information that is only 
implied in a story. We are especially interested in the 
earliest age at which this ability develops.
Your child, if he or she participates, will see sentences 
on a computer screen that form a short story. After the 
child reads this stimulus, a series of questions will be 
asked, and the child is asked to respond to each question 
as quickly as possible, simply by pressing one of two 
buttons corresponding to ”yes" or "no”. We learn about the 
inference-drawing process by measuring the speed of 
response to these different questions. The study will take 
place in a room on the school grounds and should take no 
more than 20 minutes.
We hope that the children will benefit from the exposure to 
new reading materials, and we believe that we will be able 
to advance our knowledge about the development of the 
inference-drawing process. There are no risks involved.
We present the task as a game, and have always found that 
children enjoy participating. Your child’s name will not 
be associated in any way with the research results.
Families of those children who participate will be sent a 
report of the results of the research.
Your cooperation in permitting your child to participate 
will be greatly appreciated. Please complete the bottom 
portion of this form and return it to the school as soon as 
possible. If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate
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to call either Mark at 554-2398 (office) and 558-2925 
(home), or Dr. Simpson at 554-2592 (office).
Sincerely,
I have read the description of the inference-drawing 
project, and I understand the procedures to be followed, 
the absence of risk and discomfort, and the benefits to be 
received. I understand that any questions I have about the 
project will be answered. I also understand that I may 
withdraw my consent and discontinue my child's 
participation at any time.
YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER TO ALLOW YOUR CHILD TO 
PARTICIPATE. YOUR SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT, HAVING READ 
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE, YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PERMIT 
YOUR CHILD TO PARTICIPATE. YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF 
THIS CONSENT FORM TO KEEP.
Mark A. Casteel 
Psychology Graduate 
Student
Gregory B. Simpson, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of 
Psychology
Name of Child
has my permission to 
participate in Mark 
Casteel's inference- 
drawing project.
Signature of Parent of Guardian Date
t
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School-Age Children's Informed Consent Form
You are being asked to participate in a study that will 
tell us how people answer questions about things they have 
read in stories. You will be shown some sentences on a 
computer screen that will tell a story. There will be nine 
stories to read. After each story, you will be asked to 
answer 11 questions as fast as you can.
There is no right or wrong way to perform in this study, we 
just want you to do the best that you can.
You do not have to be in the study, and even if you decide 
to participate, you may change your mind and quit at any 
time. Before you decide to be in the study, you should 
talk to your parents about it.
I agree to participate in this research project.
Signature of Child Date
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Undergraduate's Informed Consent Form
CONSENT FORM
You are invited to participate in a research project 
examining people's ability to infer outcomes or 
consequences from a story. As a participant in this study, 
you will see sentences on a computer screen that form a 
short story. After you have read this stimulus, a series 
of questions will be asked, and your task is to respond as 
quickly as possible, simply by pressing one of two buttons 
corresponding to ''yes'' or "no.'' We will learn about the 
inference- drawing process by measuring the speed of 
response to these different questions. A total of nine 
stories will be presented, one practice and the rest timed. 
Eight questions will be asked about each story. In 
addition to the stories, you will asked to read fifteen 
individual sentences and press a button as soon as you have 
completed reading each one. This will give us an 
indication of your reading speed. At the conclusion of the 
experimental session, the investigator will describe the 
purpose of the study and its possible importance. At this 
time, you will have an opportunity to discuss the reasoning 
behind the study and its possible benefits to psychological 
knowledge.
Your responses will be kept confidential. Your name will 
not be associated in any way with the information you 
provide.
No significant risks are involved in this study beyond 
those of everyday life. The benefits for participation in 
this study are simply those of having an opportunity to see 
how a research project of this type is conducted, and to 
possibly learn something about an area of current research 
interest in cognitive psychology. We cannot promise you 
that you will receive any benefits other than those 
discussed here. Should you decide to participate in this 
study, your participation may satisfy one of several 
options available to your for obtaining extra course credit 
in your psychology course, as described to you by your 
instructor. However, you do have the option of performing 
alternate activities for such credit should you choose not 
to participate.
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Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision 
whether or not to participate in this survey will not 
affect your relationship with the University of Nebraska, 
nor your participation in any of your classes in 
psychology. If you decide to participate, you are free to 
withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at 
any time. Furthermore, you have the right to withdraw your 
data from this study following completion of the 
questionnaire should you decide to do so. If you have any 
questions, please ask the investigator now. If you have 
any additional questions later, Mark Casteel, who may be 
reached at the phone number listed below, will be happy to 
answer them.
YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE. 
YOUR SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO 
PARTICIPATE HAVING READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE.
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS FORM TO KEEP.
Date
Mark A. Casteel (554-2398) 
Greg B. Simpson, Ph.D.
Participant's Signature
Investigator's Signature
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Reading Speed Sentences and Questions
Sentences Questions
Pract ice
Mike threw the ball to home 
plate.
The train did not stop at 
the small town.
Because she was excited, Kim 
ran home from school.
Timed
The old man slipped on the ice.
Jack found some money and put 
it in his pocket.
Betsy went to the store and 
bought some candy.
The dog named spot found the 
blue ball.
When the lady got home from 
work, she ate her supper.
The big white cat sat on 
the fence.
The mean old man did not 
have any friends.
What did Mike throw? (0)
What did not stop? (S)
What did Kim do because 
she was excited? (V)
What did the old man do? 
(V)
What did Jack find. (0)
Who went to the store? 
(S)
What did Spot find? (0)
What did the lady do when 
she got home from work? 
(V)
What did the cat do? (V)
Who did not have any 
friends? (S)
The teacher took her class 
to go see the zoo.
Where did the teacher 
take her class? (0)
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When her mother turned out 
the light, the child got 
scared.
The big bully was mean to 
all of the children.
The little boy thought that 
his teacher was pretty.
The fireman went to the house 
to put out the fire.
What did the child do 
when her mother turned 
out the light? (V)
Who was mean to the 
children? (S)
Who thought that the 
teacher was pretty? (S)
What did the fireman 
put out? (0)
(S ) indicates that the subject of the sentence was tested.
(0) indicates that the object of the sentence was tested.
(V) indicates that the verb of the sentence was tested.
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Example Story - Both Lists
Sentence Sentence Function
Bob the spy read a report by the 
f ire.
A rock flew through the window.
Bob read a note that was on the rock
He quickly threw his letter in the 
f ire.
The ashes floated up the chimney.
Bob left and ran to the bus stop.
He watched as the bus went around 
the corner.
He went back home and put the rock 
in his safe.
He shut the safe and spun the dial.
But Bob knew that someone was after 
him.
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference
Br idge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference
Bridging inference
Br idge-mate 
Filler
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Questions Asked to the Example Story
Questions Correct Response
Did Bob miss the bus? Yes
Did the window break? Yes
Did Bob go to the airport? No
Did the note arrive in an envelope? No
Did Bob burn the letter? Yes
Did Bob put the rock under his bed? No
Did the safe lock? Yes
Was Bob reading a newspaper? No
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Experimental LStories -'List 1
Sentence Sentence Function
Story 1
One day a big rainstorm hit the farm.
The strong wind blew into the windmill.
The farmer's wife had gone to feed the 
chickens.
She was caught in the rain without an 
umbrella.
The farmer made soup for his cold wife.
His wife ate the hot soup too fast.
His wife spit the soup out and yelled.
When he heard barking, the farmer 
looked out the window.
The farmer's dog was rolling in the 
mud.
The farmer would not let the dog into 
the house.
The farmer and his wife then took a 
hot bath.
Story 2
Mike and his family took a trip to 
the beach.
He stepped on some bubblegum he did 
not see.
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Br idge-mate 
Fi H e r
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Filler
Bridging inference
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Mike wiped his shoes on the grass.
Mike then went floating on his inner 
tube.
The inner tube had a leak in it.
Mike then went to get a glass of soda 
pop.
After he was done, Mike placed an 
icecube in the sun.
He then saw a ball and ran to get it.
As he ran, Mike stepped on his 
shoestring.
He skinned his knee but kept on 
running.
Mike and his family then left to go 
home.
Story 3
One morning Lisa helped her mother 
water the garden.
She turned on the water faucet to 
fill a bucket.
While she was outside, Lisa saw a 
rabbit.
Lisa quickly ran toward the rabbit.
She just was not fast enough.
That afternoon the gardener came to 
spray the garden.
The gardener sprayed poison all over 
the weeds.
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Forward inference 
Fi H e r
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Bridging inference
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Soon, all that was left were the 
pretty red flowers.
When it got dark Lisa went back 
inside.
The rabbit sneaked back into the 
carrot patch through a fence hole.
The next morning the fence hole was 
f ixed.
Story 4
One day Tom went to the grocery store.
As he left his house he caught his 
pants on a nail.
Tom's pants would have to be fixed.
Tom ran to get to the store before it 
closed.
As he ran he stepped on a banana peel.
At the store he bought many groceries.
Tom put too many groceries into the 
sack.
Tom picked up all of the cans off of 
the floor.
Tom then decided to carry the sugar 
sack by itself.
The sack of sugar ripped while being 
carried.
That night Tom went to bed early.
Story 5
Because she was bored, Tina drew a 
picture.
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Filler
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Filler
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She pressed down too hard on her 
pencil.
She had to get a new pencil.
Tina then got some magic markers 
and colored her picture.
The cap was left off of the green 
magic marker.
She then rolled up her picture and 
put a rubber band around it.
The rubber band was stretched too far.
She tied the rubber band together.
Tina felt hungry so she went to 
get a snack.
Her mother poured too much milk 
into her glass.
That night, Tina's father thought 
the picture was pretty.
Story 6
One morning Jane helped her mother 
with breakfast.
First of all, Jane put butter into 
the hot pan.
Jane's baby sister started to cry.
Jane picked her up and sang a 
lullabye to the baby.
Jane put the baby back into her 
bed.
Jane decided that she wanted eggs, 
toast, and juice.
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Br idge-mate 
Filler
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As she got the eggs, Jane dropped 
one on the floor.
There was a mess all over the floor.
Jane then got two pieces of bread.
The bread was put into the toaster 
and pushed down.
Both Jane and her mother got very 
full.
Story 7
One weekend, Pam went rollerskating 
with her friends.
She tried to rollerskate for the 
first time.
After skating, the girls had a 
slumber party at Pam's
Pam's father told the girls a ghost 
story.
All of her friends screamed.
The girls then had a pillow fight.
As Pam grabbed it, the pillow ripped 
apart.
Pam had to go get the broom.
Pam and her friends then watched 
the T.V.
They all watched the sad movie.
Since they were tired, they fell 
asleep easily.
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference
Br idge-mate 
Fi H e r
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
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Story 8
The little girl had a birthday party.
Her mother put the cake into the oven.
An hour later candles were put on.
For a present, the girl got a trumpet.
She blew into her trumpet.
She also got a red jack-in-the-box.
She turned the handle on her 
j ack-in-the-box.
Her mother lit the candles on her 
cake.
One of her friends sneezed into 
the candles.
Her mother went to get some more 
matches.
The little girl got a lot of nice 
presents.
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
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Experimental Stories - List 2
Sentence Sentence Function
Story 1
One day a big rainstorm hit the farm.
The strong wind blew into the windmill.
You could not even see the blades.
The farmer's wife had gone to feed the 
chickens.
She was caught in the rain without an 
umbrella.
Her husband brought her some dry 
clothes.
The farmer made soup for his cold wife.
His wife ate the hot soup too fast.
When he heard barking, the farmer 
looked out the window.
The farmer's dog was rolling in the 
mud.
The farmer and his wife then took a 
hot bath.
Story 2
Mike and his family took a trip to the 
beach.
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Filler
He stepped on some bubblegum he did 
not see.
Forward inference
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Mike then floating on his inner tube.
The inner tube had a leak in it.
Mike had to swim to the shore.
Mike then went to get a glass of soda 
pop.
After he was done, Mike placed an 
icecube in the sun.
Soon the icecube was gone.
He then saw a ball and ran to get it.
As he ran, Mike stepped on his 
shoestring.
Mike and his family then left to go 
home.
Story 3
One morning Lisa helped her mother 
water the garden.
She turned on the water faucet to 
fill a bucket.
The bucket was so heavy that she had 
trouble carrying it.
While she was outside, Lisa saw a 
rabbit.
Lisa quickly ran toward the rabbit.
That afternoon the gardener came to 
spray the garden.
The gardener sprayed poison all over 
the weeds.
When it got dark Lisa went back inside.
Filler 
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
F iller
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
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The rabbit sneaked back into the 
carrot patch through a fence hole.
There would be no carrots for supper 
the next night
The next morning the fence hole was 
f ixed.
Story 4
One day Tom went to the grocery store.
As he left his house he caught his 
pants on a nail.
Tom ran to get to the store before it 
closed.
As he ran he stepped on a banana peel.
Tom skinned his knee and got back up.
At the store he bought many groceries.
Tom put too many groceries into the 
sack.
Tom then decided to carry the sugar 
sack by itself.
The sack of sugar ripped while being 
carried.
The sugar sack was empty when Tom got 
home.
That night Tom went to bed early.
Story 5
Because she was bored, Tina drew a 
picture.
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Filler
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She pressed down too hard on her 
pencil.
Tina then got some magic markers 
and colored her picture.
The cap was left off of the green 
magic marker.
The green marker did not work 
anymore.
She then rolled up her picture and 
put a rubber band around it.
The rubber band was stretched too far.
Tina felt hungry so she went to 
get a snack.
Her mother poured too much milk 
into her glass.
Her mother went to get a sponge.
That night, Tina's father thought 
the picture was pretty.
Story 6
One morning Jane helped her mother 
with breakfast.
First of all, Jane put butter into 
the hot pan.
Soon the pan was slippery.
Jane's baby sister started to cry.
Jane picked her up and sang a 
lullabye to the baby.
Jane decided that she wanted eggs, 
toast, and juice.
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Filler
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
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As she got the eggs, Jane dropped 
one on the floor.
Jane then got two pieces of bread.
The bread was put into the toaster 
and pushed down.
In two minutes the bread popped 
back up.
Both Jane and her mother got very 
full.
Story 7
One weekend, Pam went rollerskating 
with her friends.
She tried to rollerskate for the 
first time.
Pam really got a sore bottom
After skating, the girls had a 
slumber party at Pam’s
Pam’s father told the girls a ghost 
story.
The girls then had a pillow fight.
As Pam grabbed it, the pillow ripped 
apart.
Pam and her friends then watched 
the T.V.
They all watched the sad movie.
Pam had to get tissues for the 
gi rIs.
Since they were tired, they fell 
asleep easily.
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Br idge-mate 
Filler
Filler
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate
Filler
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Story 8
The little girl had a birthday party.
Her mother put the cake into the oven.
For a present, the girl got a trumpet.
She blew into her trumpet.
All of her friends covered their ears.
She also got a red jack-in-the-box.
She turned the handle on her 
j ack-in-the-box.
The puppet surprised the little girl.
Her mother lit the candles on her 
cake.
One of her friends sneezed into 
the candles.
The little girl got a lot of nice 
presents.
F iller
Forward inference 
Filler
Bridging inference 
Bridge-mate 
Filler
Bridging inference
Bridge-mate 
Fi H e r
Forward inference 
Filler
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Questions Asked to the Experimental Stories - Both Lists
Questions Correct Response
Story 1
Did the farmer's wife burn her mouth? Yes
Did the dog get dirty? " Yes
Did the farmer make his wife some cake? No
Did the farmer hear laughing? No
Was the sun shining? No
Did the farmer’s wife get wet? Yes
Did the farmer’s wife feed the cows? No
Did the blades on the windmill turn around? Yes
Story 2
Did the bubblegum stick to Mike's shoe? Yes
Did the icecube melt? Yes
Did the inner tube go flat? Yes
Did Mike go to the movies? No
Did Mike trip and fall? Yes
Did Mike ride on a boat? No
Did Mike buy a candy bar? No
Did Mike run after a kite? No
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Story 3
Did the rabbit eat the carrots in the patch? Yes
Did Lisa see a frog? No
Did Lisa play outside after it got dark? No
Did the weeds die? Yes
Did water come out of the faucet? Yes
Did a man come to paint the house? No
Did the rabbit hop away? Yes
Did Lisa help her mother was the car? No
Story 4
Did Tom walk slowly to the store? No
Did the grocery sack break? Yes
Did Tom go to the paint store? No
Did Tom put the sugar sack in a car? No
Did the sugar spill out of the sack? Yes
Did Tom buy any nails? No
Did Tom's pants rip? Yes
Did Tom slip and fall on the banana peel? Yes
Story 5
Was Tina full from eating dinner? No
Did the green marker dry up? Yes
Did the rubber band break? Yes
Did Tina's pencil tip break? Yes
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Did Tina paint a horse? No
Did milk spill out of Tina's glass Yes
Did Tina put tape around the picture? No
Did Tina tear up her picture? No
Story 6
Did the egg break? Yes
Did Jane want any pancakes? No
Did Jane's baby sister start to laugh? No
Did the bread get toasted? Yes
Did the butter in the pan melt? Yes
Did Jane go and get two muffins? No
Did the baby fall asleep? Yes
Did Jane help to make supper? No
Story 7
Did Pam go fishing? No
Did the movie make the girls cry? Yes
Did Pam and her friends listen to the radio? No
Did the stuffing come out of the pillow? Yes
Did the girls throw food at each other? No
Did Pam fall down a lot from rollerskating? Yes
Did the ghost story scare Pam's friends? Yes
Did the girls go to Pam's to go swimming? No
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Story 8
Did the trumpet make a noise? Yes
Did the girl have a Christmas party? No
Did the mother light a fire in the fireplace? No
Did the candles go out? Yes
Did the cake bake? Yes
Did the jack-in-the-box pop up? Yes
Did the girl get a baseball bat? No
Did the girl' get a green doll? No
